Greater priming for previously distracting information in young than older adults when suppression is ruled out

The use of previously distracting information on memory tests with indirect instructions is usually age-equivalent, while young adults typically show greater explicit memory for such information. This could reflect qualitatively distinct initial processing (encoding) of distracting information by younger and older adults, but could also be caused by greater suppression of such information by younger adults on tasks with indirect instructions. In Experiment 1, young and older adults read stories containing distracting words, which they ignored, before studying a list of words containing previously distracting items for a free recall task. Half the participants were informed of the presence of previously distracting items in the study list prior to recall (direct instruction), and half were not (indirect instruction). Recall of previously distracting words was age-equivalent in the indirect condition, but young adults recalled more distracting words in the direct condition. In Experiment 2, participants performed the continuous identification with recognition task, which captures a measure of perceptual priming and recognition on each trial, and is immune to suppression. Priming and recognition of previously distracting words was greater in younger than older adults, suggesting that the young engage in more successful suppression of previously distracting information on tasks in which its relevance is not overtly signaled

Children and older adults exhibit distinct sub-optimal cost-benefit functions when preparing to move their eyes and hands

"© 2015 Gonzalez et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited"Numerous activities require an individual to respond quickly to the correct stimulus. The provision of advance information allows response priming but heightened responses can cause errors (responding too early or reacting to the wrong stimulus). Thus, a balance is required between the online cognitive mechanisms (inhibitory and anticipatory) used to prepare and execute a motor response at the appropriate time. We investigated the use of advance information in 71 participants across four different age groups: (i) children, (ii) young adults, (iii) middle-aged adults, and (iv) older adults. We implemented 'cued' and 'non-cued' conditions to assess age-related changes in saccadic and touch responses to targets in three movement conditions: (a) Eyes only; (b) Hands only; (c) Eyes and Hand. Children made less saccade errors compared to young adults, but they also exhibited longer response times in cued versus non-cued conditions. In contrast, older adults showed faster responses in cued conditions but exhibited more errors. The results indicate that young adults (18 -25 years) achieve an optimal balance between anticipation and execution. In contrast, children show benefits (few errors) and costs (slow responses) of good inhibition when preparing a motor response based on advance information; whilst older adults show the benefits and costs associated with a prospective response strategy (i.e., good anticipation)

Why are we not flooded by involuntary thoughts about the past and future? Testing the cognitive inhibition dependency hypothesis

© The Author(s) 2018In everyday life, involuntary thoughts about future plans and events occur as often as involuntary thoughts about the past. However, compared to involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs), such episodic involuntary future thoughts (IFTs) have become a focus of study only recently. The aim of the present investigation was to examine why we are not constantly flooded by IFTs and IAMs given that they are often triggered by incidental cues while performing undemanding activities. One possibility is that activated thoughts are suppressed by the inhibitory control mechanism, and therefore depleting inhibitory control should enhance the frequency of both IFTs and IAMs. We report an experiment with a between-subjects design, in which participants in the depleted inhibition condition performed a 60-min high-conflict Stroop task before completing a laboratory vigilance task measuring the frequency of IFTs and IAMs. Participants in the intact inhibition condition performed a version of the Stroop task that did not deplete inhibitory control. To control for physical and mental fatigue resulting from performing the 60-min Stroop tasks in experimental conditions, participants in the control condition completed only the vigilance task. Contrary to predictions, the number of IFTs and IAMs reported during the vigilance task, using the probe-caught method, did not differ across conditions. However, manipulation checks showed that participants’ inhibitory resources were reduced in the depleted inhibition condition, and participants were more tired in the experimental than in the control conditions. These initial findings suggest that neither inhibitory control nor physical and mental fatigue affect the frequency of IFTs and IAMs.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

Capacity and Procedural Accounts of Impaired Memory in Depression

Findings of impaired memory in states of dysphoria or depression are summarized and subsumed under different accounts of mood-related memory deficits. Theoretical accounts based on the assumption of a storage system of limited capacity are compared to accounts which emphasize the role of procedures and strategies in attending and remembering. Two reanalyses of a recent experiment in the process-dissociation paradigm are reported. They address issues of dysphoria-related differences in automatic versus controlled uses of memory in a task of word-stem completion. The two reanalyses rest on different assumptions about the relation between automatic and controlled components, but they converge in highlighting the advantages of a procedural rather than capacity-based view of memory deficits. finally. similarities to other research domains and theoretical approaches are outlined

Neural Mechanisms of Interference Control in Working Memory: Effects of Interference Expectancy and Fluid Intelligence

A critical aspect of executive control is the ability to limit the adverse effects of interference. Previous studies have shown activation of left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex after the onset of interference, suggesting that interference may be resolved in a reactive manner. However, we suggest that interference control may also operate in a proactive manner to prevent effects of interference. The current study investigated the temporal dynamics of interference control by varying two factors - interference expectancy and fluid intelligence (gF) - that could influence whether interference control operates proactively versus reactively.A modified version of the recent negatives task was utilized. Interference expectancy was manipulated across task blocks by changing the proportion of recent negative (interference) trials versus recent positive (facilitation) trials. Furthermore, we explored whether gF affected the tendency to utilize specific interference control mechanisms. When interference expectancy was low, activity in lateral prefrontal cortex replicated prior results showing a reactive control pattern (i.e., interference-sensitivity during probe period). In contrast, when interference expectancy was high, bilateral prefrontal cortex activation was more indicative of proactive control mechanisms (interference-related effects prior to the probe period). Additional results suggested that the proactive control pattern was more evident in high gF individuals, whereas the reactive control pattern was more evident in low gF individuals.The results suggest the presence of two neural mechanisms of interference control, with the differential expression of these mechanisms modulated by both experimental (e.g., expectancy effects) and individual difference (e.g., gF) factors

Executive function and intelligence in the resolution of temporary syntactic ambiguity: An individual differences investigation

In the current study, we examined the role of intelligence and executive functions in the resolution of temporary syntactic ambiguity using an individual differences approach. Data were collected from 174 adolescents and adults who completed a battery of cognitive tests as well as a sentence comprehension task. The critical items for the comprehension task consisted of object/subject garden paths (e.g. While Anna dressed the baby that was small and cute played in the crib.), and participants answered a comprehension question (e.g. Did Anna dress the baby?) following each one. Previous studies have shown that garden-path misinterpretations tend to persist into final interpretations. Results showed that both intelligence and processing speed interacted with ambiguity. Individuals with higher intelligence and faster processing were more likely to answer the comprehension questions correctly, and specifically, following ambiguous as opposed to unambiguous sentences. Inhibition produced a marginal effect, but the variance in inhibition was largely shared with intelligence. Conclusions focus on the role of individual differences in cognitive ability and their impact on syntactic ambiguity resolution

Mirroring Intentional Forgetting in a Shared-Goal Learning Situation

Background: Intentional forgetting refers to the surprising phenomenon that we can forget previously successfully encoded memories if we are instructed to do so. Here, we show that participants cannot only intentionally forget episodic memories but they can also mirror the ‘‘forgetting performance’ ’ of an observed model. Methodology/Principal Findings: In four experiments a participant observed a model who took part in a memory experiment. In Experiment 1 and 2 observers saw a movie about the experiment, whereas in Experiment 3 and 4 the observers and the models took part together in a real laboratory experiment. The observed memory experiment was a directed forgetting experiment where the models learned two lists of items and were instructed either to forget or to remember the first list. In Experiment 1 and 3 observers were instructed to simply observe the experiment (‘‘simple observation’ ’ instruction). In Experiment 2 and 4, observers received instructions aimed to induce the same learning goal for the observers and the models (‘‘observation with goal-sharing’ ’ instruction). A directed forgetting effect (the reliably lower recall of to-be-forgotten items) emerged only when models received the ‘‘observation with goal-sharing’ ’ instruction (P,.001 in Experiment 2, and P,.05 in Experiment 4), and it was absent when observers received the ‘‘simple observation’’ instruction (P..1 in Experiment 1 and 3). Conclusion: If people observe another person with the same intention to learn, and see that this person is instructed t